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1 Introduction
In this paper we consider a dynamic macroeconomic model of imperfect competi-
tion and show that it exhibits multiple equilibria and endogenous business cycles
°uctuating between regimes of Keynesian unemployment and Walrasian full employ-
ment. We investigate how ¯scal policy a®ects the equilibrium cycles and show that
appropriate policies stabilize the business cycles in a standard Keynesian way.
Our multiplicity result emerges from a coordination problem between ¯rms com-
peting in a homogenous product market who face an input supply constraint on
the labour market. Consider an elementary Cournot model of a homogeneous out-
put market with N identical ¯rms where production takes place under symmetric,
constant marginal cost. Speci¯cally suppose the ¯rms produce output from a ho-
mogeneous labour service under unit constant returns (so \output=labour input"),
and the constant marginal cost is then some exogenously ¯xed wage rate w. Sup-
pose also that only these N ¯rms employ this labour service, and that the supply
of labour at w exceeds the Cournot{Nash aggregate output (=employment) level,
so there is Keynesian unemployment on the ¯xed wage labour market.1 With the
same wage w suppose now that ¯rms wish to demand much more labour, so that the
labour demand from any (N ¡ 1) ¯rms exceeds the labour supply at w. In a num-
ber of models which analyse such a ¯xed{wage Cournot scenario (most explicitly
in d'Aspremont, Dos Santos Ferreira and G¶erard{Varet (1989, 1995), Kaas (1998),
Schultz (1992)), it is simply assumed to be infeasible for ¯rms to o®er such labour
demands. Here we assume instead, as seems at least reasonable for a ¯xed{wage
labour market, that excess demands/supplies are rationed according to some well{
1For instance, suppose N = 2 and inverse output demand is p = 1 ¡ (y1 + y2) where yi is the
output and `i = yi is the employment at ¯rm i = 1; 2. If L is labour supply at the ¯xed wage
w, there is unemployment at the Cournot{Nash equilibrium if 2(1 ¡ w)=3 < L, or w > 1 ¡ 3L=2.
(The paper will use CES derived demand rather than linear).
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behaved rationing mechanism. With the excess labour demand indicated above,
it follows that variations in any one ¯rm's labour demand will have no e®ect on
aggregate employment (which remains equal to aggregate labour supply at w), and
hence no e®ect on aggregate output or its price. Price responses to individual ¯rm
output variations are now essentially Walrasian in nature, and it is easy to show that
plausible rationing assumptions produce a range of wages at which there exist both
a Cournot{Nash style equilibrium with Keynesian unemployment and a Walrasian
style equilibrium with full employment.2
Now suppose all this happens in each sector of a multi{sector overlapping genera-
tions economy where a sectoral trade union sets the wage in each period prior to
the ¯rms in that sector engaging in our ¯xed{wage Cournot game. Union wage
demands depend on whether ¯rms coordinate on the full employment or the un-
employment continuation after wages which produce two continuations; multiple
temporary equilibria emerge immediately. Assuming that a commonly observed
extraneous \sunspot" signal (\boom" or \recession") dictates the selection of the
continuation, we show that under laissez{faire, although the model has a unique
steady state equilibrium which is Walrasian, there exists also a multiplicity of (de-
terministic and stochastic) rational expectations equilibria with endogenous cycling
between boom periods of Walrasian full employment and recession periods of Keyne-
sian unemployment (Theorem 1). Moreover, traditional Keynesian countercyclical
¯scal policies (e.g. positive government expenditure in recessions but not in booms)
can generate traditional responses, i.e. unit multipliers when the budget is balanced
by lump{sum taxes in each period (Theorem 2) which become greater than one with
2Continuing footnote 1, if ¯rm j's labour demand is at least L and that of ¯rm i is Ji, a plausible
\symmetric" rationing speci¯cation has `i = Ji, `j = L ¡ Ji if Ji · L=2 and `i = `j = L=2 if
Ji ¸ L=2. Any Ji ¸ L (e.g.) is a best response for i if 1 ¡ L ¡ w ¸ 0, since i's pro¯t is then
(1 ¡ L ¡ w)L=2 and deviations have no e®ect on price (1 ¡ L) and cannot increase `i. Thus the
model has 2 Nash equilibrium employment/output levels if 1 ¡ L ¸ w > 1 ¡ 3L=2.
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unbalanced budgets at the beginning of a recession, balanced by lump{sum taxes at
the end (Theorem 3).
The literature contains a number of models which generate multiple equilibria and/or
endogenous business cycles from varying imperfect competition assumptions (see
Silvestre (1995) for a relevant survey). Closest to our model are the overlapping
generations models of d'Aspremont, Dos Santos Ferreira & G¶erard-Varet (1995),
Jacobsen (2000) and Rivard (1994),3 in all of which the cycles require some gross
complementarity in demand, or increasing returns to labour.4 A novelty of our
paper is that we need no such assumptions, the cycles emerging (with gross substi-
tutes and constant returns) from the multiple equilibria of the ¯xed wage Cournot
game which needs nothing \unusual" in fundamentals.5 Because of the multiple
temporary equilibria, the backward (and forward) dynamics of our model follows a
set{valued di®erence equation (i.e., the right hand side is a correspondence rather
than a function), where the selection from the correspondence is dictated by the
deterministic or stochastic sunspot (boom or recession) series. A large set (an in¯n-
ity) of deterministic cycles emerges which are all locally determinate (stable in the
3Also close to our model in the sense that they embody essentially the same ¯xed{wage Cournot
idea but with wage{setting ¯rms rather than trade unions are Gaygisiz & Madden (1997) where the
labour market is spatially di®erentiated and multiple steady{states emerge, and the static model
of Kaas & Madden (1999) where the labour market is homogeneous but involuntary unemployment
results despite the absence of trade unions.
4Gross complement assumptions are required in Jacobsen (2000), as they are for the perfectly
competitive cycles of Benhabib & Day (1982) and Grandmont (1985). Rivard (1994) assumes
increasing returns, d'Aspremont et al. (1995) assume either increasing returns or gross comple-
mentarity.
5In the wider multiple equilibrium literature, features of other models which create multiplicities
are also absent from our paper, including (again) the increasing returns of Kiyotaki (1988), Manning
(1990, 1992), Rivard (1994), the di®ering elasticities of consumption and investment demand of
Gali (1994) and the strategic complementarity in the entry of new ¯rms of Chatterjee, Cooper &
Ravikumar (1993).
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backward perfect foresight dynamics), as well as nearby stochastic equilibria.6 Our
°uctuations are thus very much dependent on \animal spirits". However, a second
important novelty of the paper compared with existing endogenous business cycle
models is that (almost) all of our cycles have in common the business cycle asym-
metries of steepness, deepness and sharpness (McQueen & Thorley (1993), Sichel
(1993)), as well as exhibiting the empirically plausible co{movement of procyclical
vacancies (plus procyclical real wages, in°ation and countercyclical markups).
Although money is neutral and superneutral { as in other models of perfect and
imperfect competition with rational expectations but without nominal rigidities {
our Keynesian ¯scal policy results stand in contrast to other models of the literature
in which policy responses are of a more Walrasian nature. Dixon (1987), Mankiw
(1988) and Benassy (1995) consider general equilibrium models of imperfect compe-
tition and ¯nd positive balanced{budget multipliers less than one. In their models,
the positive e®ect on output follows from a stimulation of labour supply since a
higher tax burden causes a lower demand for leisure, provided that leisure is a nor-
mal good.7 Jacobsen & Schultz (1994) consider an overlapping generations model
with an imperfectly competitive labour market and show that ¯scal policy can only
a®ect output when the public and the private demand elasticities di®er. If these
elasticities are equal, there is full crowding out since price changes completely o®set
the increase in aggregate demand. In our model, a higher (lump{sum) tax burden
has no e®ect on labour supply, and prices and wages are una®ected by the ¯scal pol-
icy during recessions. Therefore, our model has unit multipliers and reproduces the
6Azariadis & Smith (1998) consider a Diamond{type growth model with multiple temporary
equilibria in which the dynamics is also described by a set{valued di®erence equation and in which
an in¯nity of locally stable cycles °uctuating between two regimes emerges.
7Similar labour supply e®ects are also at work in the Walrasian OLG economies of Grandmont
(1986) and Aloi, Jacobsen & Lloyd-Braga (2000) who show that appropriate monetary and ¯scal
policy rules can stabilize endogenous °uctuations.
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policy result of the seminal article of Hart (1982) in a dynamic general equilibrium
model.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we introduce the model
and show how the coordination problem of the ¯xed{wage Cournot game leads to
multiple temporary equilibria. In Section 3 we characterize intertemporal equilibria
and prove the existence and multiplicity of laissez{faire cycles. Section 4 contains
our policy results and Section 5 concludes. All proofs not included in the text are
contained in Appendix A.
2 The model
Consider an overlapping generations model in discrete time t = 0; 1; 2; : : :, in which
there are three types of goods, labour, output and ¯at money. There is a continuum
of sectors s 2 [0; 1] each of which comprises one wage{setting union and N > 1
price{setting ¯rms producing the sector output from sector{speci¯c labour. In each
period and in each sector a continuum [0; L] of two{period living consumers is born
who supply labour in the ¯rst period of their life and who consume in both lifetime
periods. The labour endowment of each consumer possesses speci¯c attributes which
allows him to be employed only in his sector, but not elsewhere. However, consumers
receive pro¯t income from various sectors (a negligible fraction coming from any
one sector) and they consume output of all sectors. To ¯nance future consumption,
consumers save part of their income as ¯at money. There is a government who
consumes output goods, levies a lump{sum tax on young consumers, pays a nominal
interest rate on money holdings (or taxes money holdings), and ¯nances its de¯cit
by seignorage.
Both the labour and the output market are imperfectly competitive. Each sectoral
output market is characterized by the ¯xed{wage Cournot competition of the intro-
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duction. Firms take the sector wage as given which is set by the sector trade union
at a preceding stage. Thus, in each period we consider a two{stage game between
the monopolistic trade union and the N ¯rms in each sector.
In the rest of this section, we ¯rst describe the consumers' behaviour and derive from
it the objective output demand and labour supply functions. Then we formulate
the game between the union and the ¯rms whose equilibrium solution leads to the
de¯nition of a temporary equilibrium.
The consumers
Each consumer born in period t has an endowment of one unit of indivisible sector{
speci¯c labour and receives when young wage and pro¯t income. Preferences of all
young consumers are identical and are represented by the utility function
u(Ct; Ct+1)¡ b`t ;
Ct =
³ Z 1
0
c
(½¡1)=½
st ds
´½=(½¡1)
; Ct+1 =
³ Z 1
0
c
(½¡1)=½
s;t+1 ds
´½=(½¡1)
;
where cst and cs;t+1 denote consumption of sector s output in period t, t+1 respec-
tively, ½ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between sector outputs, `t 2 f0; 1g is
labour supply, and b ¸ 0 is disutility of work. The function u is assumed to be twice
di®erentiable, strictly quasi{concave, strictly monotone, homogenous of degree one,
and such that indi®erence curves do not cut the axes.
Each young consumer supplying labour in sector s^ takes the sector wage ws^t as well
as prices of output goods pst as given and forecasts future prices ps;t+1 correctly.
Let Rt+1 denote the gross nominal interest rate on money holdings from t to t + 1
(which is a tax if Rt+1 < 1). Each young consumer faces the budget constraintsZ 1
0
pstcstds+ ¹t · ws^t`t + ¼t ¡ 't ;Z 1
0
ps;t+1cs;t+1ds · Rt+1¹t ;
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where 't is a lump{sum tax, ¼t is the consumer's pro¯t income and ¹t is his money
savings.
Output demand
Since all young consumers have identical homothetic preferences, the consumption
demand for sector s output of all young consumers is
DYst =
³pst
Pt
´¡½
c
³ Pt+1
PtRt+1
´Int
Pt
;
where
Pt =
³ Z 1
0
p1¡½st ds
´1=(1¡½)
; Pt+1 =
³ Z 1
0
p1¡½s;t+1ds
´1=(1¡½)
are the aggregate price levels in period t and t+1, Int is the aggregate net (wage and
pro¯t) income of young consumers in period t, and c : (0;1) ! (0; 1) is the propen-
sity to consume, i.e. the fraction of income to be spent on ¯rst period consumption
as a function of the real interest rate. LetMt¡1 denote the aggregate money savings
of the old generation at the beginning of period t and let gt = (
R 1
0 g
(½¡1)=½
st ds)
½=(½¡1)
be the aggregator of government consumption (real government demand). Then the
consumption demand of the old consumers and of the government8 are
DOst =
³pst
Pt
´¡½Mt¡1Rt
Pt
and DGst =
³pst
Pt
´¡½
gt:
The aggregate demand for sector s output can be written
Dst = D
Y
st +D
O
st +D
G
st =
³pst
Pt
´¡½
Yt
where
Yt = c
³ Pt+1
PtRt+1
´Int
Pt
+
Mt¡1Rt
Pt
+ gt
8The sector demand of the government can be obtained either as the solution of the expenditure
minimization problem subject to a given level of real government demand gt or as the solution of
the maximization of government consumption gt subject to a given budget. Notice that the demand
elasticities of the government and of consumers are the same, and so we have no elasticity e®ects
of ¯scal policy unlike Jacobsen & Schultz (1994).
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is aggregate demand. If ¯rms do not ration demand (which will be a property
of equilibrium), aggregate sector output yst equals demand Dst, and therefore the
aggregate net income can be written Int =
R 1
0 pstystds ¡ 'tL = Pt(Yt ¡ ¿t) where
¿t := ('tL)=Pt denotes the aggregate real lump{sum tax. Using the government's
budget constraint Mt = Mt¡1Rt + Ptgt ¡ Pt¿t, we obtain the aggregate demand
identity
Yt =
Mt
Pt
³
1¡ c
³ Pt+1
PtRt+1
´´ + ¿t : (1)
Notice that Yt is increasing in the real lump{sum tax. This is due to the fact that
Mt denotes the money holdings at the end of the period, and therefore a higher
real lump{sum tax ¿t at a given level of Mt increases the autonomous demand
Mt¡1Rt=Pt + gt by the same amount and is partially o®set by the decrease of the
demand of young consumers c(:)Int =Pt.
Labour supply
The utility of a young individual in sector s who consumes optimally can be written
wst`t + ¼t ¡ 't
Ptf
³ Pt+1
PtRt+1
´ ¡ b`t ;
where f(µ) := 1=u(c(µ); (1 ¡ c(µ))=µ) is strictly increasing. Thus, all consumers in
sector s want to supply labour if the wage exceeds the reservation wage of workers,
wst > w
r
t := bPtf(Pt+1=(PtRt+1)), so in this case labour supply is Lst = L. If
wst < w
r
t labour supply is Lst = 0, and if wst = w
r
t , labour supply can be any
Lst 2 [0; L].
The ¯rms
In each sector s, the ¯rms j = 1; : : : ;N produce the sector output yjst from labour in-
put `jst at constant returns to scale with identical labour productivity across sectors,
8
so
yjst = A`
j
st ; j = 1; : : : ; N:
Firms take the nominal sector wage wst set by the trade union as given. Firms also
take the aggregate price level Pt, aggregate demand Yt and the correctly perceived
real gross interest rate PtRt+1=Pt+1 as given since deviations by ¯rms in one sector
do not a®ect any of these. Therefore, ¯rms face on the labour market the labour
supply constraint Lst and on the output market the uniformly elastic demand curve
Dst = (pst=Pt)
¡½Yt.
We consider the following game between ¯rms after the trade union has set the
sector wage. Firms simultaneously demand labour J jst ¸ 0. If aggregate labour
demand is not equal to the labour supply, one market side has to be rationed. If
the labour supply exceeds demand, Lst >
PN
j=1 J
j
st, some workers are involuntarily
unemployed and the employment levels are `jst = J
j
st. If there is excess demand
for labour, Lst <
PN
j=1 J
j
st, all workers willing to work are employed, but ¯rms are
rationed. We assume that ¯rms are uniformly rationed, i.e. each ¯rm faces a uniform
non{manipulable employment constraint ¹cst = ¹c(J
1
st; : : : ; J
N
st ;Lst) ¸ Lst=N such that
`jst = min(J
j
st; ¹cst) and
PN
j=1 `
j
st = Lst.
From the labour allocated to ¯rms, ¯rms produce outputs yjst = A`
j
st, and the
aggregate sector output yst =
PN
j=1 y
j
st is then sold at the market clearing price
pst = Pt
³yst
Yt
´¡1=½
: (2)
This price would also be set by ¯rms if ¯rms would set prices simultaneously at a
subsequent stage.9
9Unlike the result of Kreps & Scheinkman (1983), this result does not depend on the way
consumers' demand is rationed at asymmetric prices (e±cient, proportional etc.) and ensures that
the Bertrand price setting produces an essentially Cournot outcome whenever demand is uniformly
elastic (see Madden (1998)).
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Thus, we consider Nash equilibria of the game between ¯rms in sector s who simul-
taneously demand labour (J jst)j=1;:::;N and make pro¯ts
¼j = Pt
³APNi=1`ist
Yt
´¡1=½
A`jst ¡ wst`jst where `jst = min(J jst; ¹cst) :
An important feature of this ¯xed{wage Cournot game is that it possesses, for a
certain range of wages, multiple Nash equilibria. If the wage is su±ciently high,
there exists an equilibrium with involuntary unemployment which coincides with
the Cournot equilibrium in which ¯rms directly compete in employment/output
ignoring the labour supply constraint. But at the same wage there may also exist a
full employment equilibrium in which ¯rms create an excess demand for labour. If
the aggregate labour demand is large, the employment/output decision of a single
¯rm has no e®ect on aggregate employment and output which remain at their full
employment levels, even when a single ¯rm decides not to produce. Thus, the
quantity decision of each ¯rm does not a®ect the resulting output price, and therefore
all ¯rms e®ectively behave as if they were price takers. As a result, each ¯rm is
willing to expand its demand for labour as long as the wage is less than or equal
to the perfectly competitive sector wage. This wage is de¯ned by price{taking
behaviour of ¯rms and sector output and labour market clearing and is the same
across all sectors:
wct := APt
³
Yt
AL
´1=½
:
Formally, these results are stated in the following Proposition in which we restrict
attention to wages above the reservation wage.
Proposition 1: Suppose wst ¸ wrt . Then
(a) If wst >
½N ¡ 1
½N w
c
t , there exists a Nash equilibrium of the ¯xed{wage Cournot
game in sector s with involuntary unemployment in which
NX
j=1
J jst =
NX
j=1
`jst = `st =
³½N ¡ 1
½N
wct
wst
´½
L < L and pst =
½N
½N ¡ 1
wst
A :
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(b) If wst · wct , there exists a Nash equilibrium of the ¯xed{wage Cournot game in
sector s with full employment where
J jst ¸ LN ¡ 1 ; j = 1; : : : ; N;
NX
j=1
`jst = `st = L and pst = Pt
³
Yt
AL
´1=½
:
The relation between the sector wage wst and sector employment in the Nash
equilibria of Proposition 1 is illustrated in Figure 1. For wages in the interval
(wct(½N ¡ 1)=(½N); wct ] there exist two Nash equilibria. We assume that ¯rms coor-
dinate on one of these equilibria in accordance with an exogenous (sunspot) state
St. More speci¯cally, in case of a \boom" state St = B we assume that ¯rms be-
lieve in tight labour market conditions leading to excess demand for labour and full
employment for all wst · wct , such that the equilibrium of type (b) in Proposition 1
emerges. In case of a \recession" state St = R, ¯rms believe in slack labour market
conditions producing involuntary unemployment for all wst > w
c
t (½N ¡ 1)=(½N).
Obviously, for all wages wst > w
c
t an unemployment equilibrium follows and for all
wages wst · wct(½N ¡1)=(½N) a full employment equilibrium results, irrespective of
the state R or B.10
The unions
We assume a utilitarian union maximizing the integral of the utilities of the workers
in its sector. Since by assumption workers in each sector receive (almost all) pro¯t
income in other sectors, the union does not care about the pro¯t income in its sector.
Thus, the union sets the sector wage wst in order to maximize the objective function
`st(wst ¡ wrt ).
The union observes the exogenous state St and anticipates the labor demand be-
haviour of ¯rms in this state. Hence it maximizes `st(wst ¡ wrt ) subject to
`st = L ; if wst · wct ; `st =
³½N ¡ 1
½N
wct
wst
´½
L ; if wst > w
c
t ; in state St = B ;
10Of course there are many more possible selection rules between the two equilibria, but this
rule is the only one for which the selection is independent of the sector wage.
11
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Figure 1: Relation between sector employment and the sector wage.
`st = min
³
1;
³½N ¡ 1
½N
wct
wst
´½´
L ; in state St = R :
The solution of this problem is stated in the following Proposition.
Proposition 2:
(a) If St = R, the union's optimal sector wage is
wst = max
³ ½
½¡ 1wrt ;
½N ¡ 1
½N w
c
t
´
:
(b) If St = B, there exists a unique z 2 (1; ½=(½¡1)), such that the union's optimal
sector wage is wst = w
c
t if and only if w
c
t ¸ zwrt . If wct < zwrt , the union's
optimal sector wage is wst = ½w
r
t=(½¡ 1).
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The temporary equilibrium
We are now ready to formulate the temporary equilibrium of this economy in a
period t which is de¯ned as an equilibrium of prices, wages, employment and output
given expectations about future prices and interest rates and a realization of the
sunspot state St, where we impose the assumption that all sectors coordinate on the
same exogenous state B or R. Proposition 2 then implies that unions in all sectors set
the same wage wst = wt, and Proposition 1 implies that employment levels, outputs
and prices in all sectors coincide: `st = `t, yst = yt = Yt = A`t, and pst = pt = Pt.
Suppose that state R prevails in period t. Then from Proposition 1 (a), Proposition
2 (a), and the de¯nitions of wrt and w
c
t , a temporary equilibrium (Pt; wt; Yt) satis¯es
the aggregate demand identity (1) and
wt = max
³ Ptb½
½¡ 1f
³ Pt+1
PtRt+1
´
; ½N ¡ 1½N APt
³
Yt
AL
´1=½´
; Pt =
½N
½N ¡ 1
wt
A : (3)
Notice that there is unemployment if the maximum is attained by the ¯rst term in
the bracket. In the terminology of the literature on disequilibrium macroeconomics
(see e.g. Benassy (1993)), such an equilibrium is of the Keynesian unemployment
type since there is an \excess supply" on the labour and on the output market
(more precisely, at the prevailing prices ¯rms would want to sell more output and
households would want to work more). If the maximum is attained by the second
term in the bracket, there is a full employment equilibrium which is a boundary case
between the regimes of Keynesian unemployment and repressed in°ation. Output
and prices are at their Walrasian temporary equilibrium levels, but the money wage
is lower, and pro¯ts and the markup are positive.
If state B prevails in period t, the condition wct ¸ zwrt , which is according to Propo-
sition 2 (b) required for a full employment equilibrium, turns out to be
A ¸ zbf
³ Pt+1
PtRt+1
´
: (4)
Hence, in this case a temporary equilibrium (Pt; wt; Yt) is a Walrasian equilibrium
13
satisfying (1), (4), Yt = AL, and wt = APt. There may also exist a Keynesian
unemployment equilibrium in state B satisfying again (1) and (3), in which case the
condition wct < zw
r
t is equivalent to
Yt < AL(z ¡ 1)(½¡ 1) : (5)
3 Intertemporal equilibria and endogenous cycles
We assume now that the sequences of policy parameters (Rt), (gt), (¿t), an initial
stock of moneyM0, and a sequence of states (St) are given, and we are interested in
the set of intertemporal equilibria with perfect foresight. Denoting the real balance
by mt =Mt=Pt, the government's budget constraint can be expressed as
Pt+1(mt+1 ¡ gt+1 + ¿t+1) = mtRt+1Pt : (6)
Using this identity, the aggregate demand equation (1) is rewritten as
Yt =
mt
1¡ c(mt=(mt+1 ¡ gt+1 + ¿t+1)) + ¿t : (7)
Using the notation
® := 1
f¡1(A(½N ¡ 1)(½¡ 1)=(bN½2)) and ± :=
1
f¡1(A=(bz))
(< ®) ;
the conditions (3){(5) can be expressed more conveniently as follows. If St = R, it
follows from (3) that there is a Keynesian unemployment equilibrium if
mt+1 ¡ gt+1 + ¿t+1 = ®mt and Yt < AL ; (8)
and that there is full employment if
mt+1 ¡ gt+1 + ¿t+1 ¸ ®mt and Yt = AL : (9)
If St = B, (4) implies that there is a (Walrasian) full employment equilibrium if
mt+1 ¡ gt+1 + ¿t+1 ¸ ±mt and Yt = AL ; (10)
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and (3) and (5) imply that there is Keynesian unemployment if
mt+1 ¡ gt+1 + ¿t+1 = ®mt and Yt < (z ¡ 1)(½¡ 1)AL : (11)
The conditions (8){(11) together with (7) show that the set of intertemporal equilib-
ria, for a given sequence of states St and ¯scal parameters (gt; ¿t), is independent (in
real terms) of the initial money stock and of the sequence of nominal interest rates.
Thus, money is neutral and superneutral, as is the case in competitive overlapping
generations models (see Grandmont (1986)).11 In the rest of this section we show
how the model produces endogenous cycles and we suppose the \laissez{faire" case
in which the government engages in no ¯scal policy (LF):
(LF) For all t ¸ 0, gt = ¿t = 0.
In this case, the bold curves in Figure 2 illustrate the equilibrium conditions (8){
(11). The line OAC indicates the condition mt+1 = ±mt, the line OBD indicates the
condition mt+1 = ®mt. The curve OABE is the Walrasian equilibrium condition
Yt =
mt
1¡ c
³
mt
mt+1
´ = AL (12)
if consumption in period t and t+1 are gross substitutes, i.e. c0 > 0 (for instance, if
u is CES with elasticity of substitution greater than 1). Condition (8) is described
by the line OB, (9) by the curve BE, (10) by the curve ABE, and (11) by some
segment of OB below B. A full employment equilibrium on BE can be compatible
with condition (9) (in state R) or with condition (10) (in state B).
11It is worth mentioning that money need neither be neutral nor superneutral in models of
imperfect competition, even if there are no menu costs or other nominal rigidities, as has been
stressed by Rankin (1992) and Rankin (1995). Rankin's results are due to the sensitivity of perfect
foresight equilibria to the price forecast functions of consumers. These e®ects play no role in our
model, however, since changes of the price in one sector will not a®ect the aggregate future price
level under any reasonable assumption on the forecasting behaviour of consumers.
15
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Figure 2: The equilibrium curves and a cycle of order 7.
It can be seen from Figure 2 that there are generically only steady states with full
employment. When ± < 1 and ® 6= 1, there exists a unique steady state ¹m in which
St = B for all t and which is stable in the backward perfect foresight dynamics.
However, there is much scope for equilibrium cycles °uctuating between Walrasian
equilibria (WE) in boom states and Keynesian unemployment equilibria (KU) in
recession states. More speci¯cally, whenever ± < 1 and ® > 1, there may exist
cycles between the curves OB and AB. Figure 2 illustrates a (deterministic) cycle
of order 7 in which ¯rms coordinate in ¯ve successive periods on state R and in
two successive periods on state B. Below we will prove an existence theorem for
general (k; l) cycles which are de¯ned as deterministic cycles of order k + l with k
successive recession periods and l successive boom periods.12 All (k; l) cycles turn
12There are of course many more cycles °uctuating between recessions and booms more than
once until they return back to their starting point or even irregular cycles, but they will not be
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out to be asymptotically stable in the local backward perfect foresight dynamics,
so they are also stable in the dynamics under adaptive learning under some mild
assumptions on the forecast function (see Grandmont & Laroque (1986)). There
exist also non{degenerate stationary sunspot equilibria close to these cycles.
We assume gross substitutes (i.e. c0 > 0, and so savings are increasing in the real in-
terest rate) and de¯ne c(0) = c and c(1) = c. Then the Walrasian equilibrium con-
dition (12) can be rewritten as mt+1 = ¯(mt) where ¯(m) := m=(c
¡1(1¡m=(AL)))
is de¯ned for m 2 ((1 ¡ c)AL; (1 ¡ c)AL) and is increasing. Let ¹m be the ¯xed
point of ¯, let m^ be the unique solution of ¯(m^) = ±m^ (see Figure 2) and de¯ne
m^l := ¯
¡(l¡1)(m^) < ¹m. Obviously, a sequence m1; : : : ;mk;mk+1; : : : ;mk+l is a (k; l)
cycle (along which the ¯rst k states are R and the remaining l states are B) if and
only if mk+1 is a ¯xed point of the map Ã(m) := ®
k ¢ ¯l(m) in the interval [m^l; ¹m]
(mk+1 must not be smaller than m^l since then the (l ¡ 1)th iterate of ¯ at mk+1
would be smaller than m^). The Theorem below shows that a necessary and su±cient
condition for such a ¯xed point is that Ã(m^l) · m^l. A consequence of this result is
that the existence of (k; 1) cycles depends only on the parameters ® and ± and that
the existence of a (k; 1) cycle implies that there exist in¯nitely many cycles with
arbitrary many boom periods and at most k recession periods.13
Theorem 1: Let c0 > 0, assume that the government follows the policy rule (LF),
assume ± < 1 < ® and let (k; l) ¸ (1; 1). Then there exists a unique (k; l) cycle if
and only if Ã(m^l) · m^l. A (k; 1) cycle exists if and only if ®k± · 1, and whenever
a (k; 1) cycle exists, then there exists also a (k0; l) cycle for any 1 · k0 · k and any
l ¸ 1. If a (k; l) cycle is interior, i.e. if the inequality in (10) is strict along the cycle,
considered here.
13Theorem 1 can easily be extended to the case of a Cobb{Douglas utility function in which c
is constant and ¯ and Ã are not de¯ned (the curve OABE in Figure 2 is then a vertical line). A
necessary and su±cient condition for the existence of a (k; l) cycle in this case is simply ®k± · 1.
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it is asymptotically stable in the local backward perfect forward dynamics and there
exist non{degenerate stationary sunspot equilibria of cardinality k + l close to this
cycle.
The cycles of our model can exhibit some stylized features of business cycles. First,
our cycles exhibit some types of business cycle asymmetries, as illustrated in Figure
3 showing the output time series of a (5,3) cycle. The ¯rst period of a recession is
characterized by a large fall in output followed (when k > 1) by a gradual climb
back to full employment. Moreover when l > 1, troughs are deeper than peaks
are tall (i.e. there is negative skewness relative to the mean). Hence, the cycles
exhibit steepness and deepness (see Sichel (1993)). They also exhibit sharpness (see
McQueen & Thorley (1993)) since (when l > 1) growth rate changes at troughs
are larger than at peaks. Second, booms are characterized by excess demand for
labour, which can be interpreted as vacancies, unlike recessions: thus procyclical
vacancies emerge. Third, since real wages are higher in booms than recessions we
have procyclical real wages and countercyclical markups. Fourth, (6) implies that
in°ation is procyclical whenever the (exogenous) sequence of nominal interest rates
is procyclical or acyclical. Finally, if k and l are large, the output time series exhibits
persistence.
We now examine brie°y the empirical plausibility of our cycles condition. In the
case of a Cobb{Douglas intertemporal utility function the conditions ®± < 1 and
® > 1 for which cycles exist are equivalent to
(N½¡ 1)(½¡ 1)
N½2
< bA <
³(N½¡ 1)(½¡ 1)
N½2
z
´1=2
: (13)
Since the real reservation wage is wrt =Pt = b(Pt+1=(PtRt+1))
1¡c and since under (LF)
the average real gross interest rate along each cycle is 1,14 b=A is a reasonable measure
14This follows from (6) and from 1 = (m1=m2) ¢ ¢ ¢ (mk+l¡1=mk+l)(mk+l=m1) along each (k; l)
cycle.
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Figure 3: A steep, deep and sharp cycle (k = 5, l = 3).
of the ratio between the real reservation wage and labour productivity. A labour
share between 0.6 and 0.7 and a replacement ratio between 0.5 and 0.8 suggest that
a rough interval of plausible values for b=A is [0:3; 0:56]. Furthermore, empirical
studies report average demand elasticities just below 2 and markup factors between
1.2 and 1.4 (see Rotemberg & Woodford (1995, pp. 260{61)). Table 1 summarizes
the upper and lower bounds for b=A of the cycles condition (13) for some values of ½
and N compatible with these studies. They are well in accordance with empirically
plausible values for b=A.
N = 2 N = 3 N = 4 N = 5
½ = 1:5 [.222,.411] [.259,.420] [.278,.419] [.289,.416]
½ = 2:0 [.375,.558] [.417,.569] [.438,.570] [.450,.568]
Table 1: Values of b=A leading to cycles.
4 Fiscal policy
The purpose of this section is to show how appropriate ¯scal policies can be e®ec-
tive in stabilizing cycles in a standard textbook Keynesian fashion. We concentrate
19
our analysis on deterministic cycles only, but we would expect similar results for
nearby stochastic sunspot cycles as well. We consider two di®erent types of poli-
cies, a balanced budget policy and an unbalanced budget ¯scal policy in which the
government runs de¯cit spending at the beginning of each recession and re{balances
the budget at the end of the recession. Both types of policies raise output but do
not a®ect equilibrium prices, the ¯rst with a ¯scal multiplier of one, and the latter
with a ¯scal multiplier in excess of one. Later we point out various limitations of
these results.
Theorem 1 describes endogenous cycles in the model without ¯scal policy. To inves-
tigate the e±cacy of ¯scal policy, we assume the economy has been in a laissez{faire
regime up to period t = 0, and has coordinated on a (k; l) cycle for some k; l ¸ 1.
At t = 0 the government announces its ¯scal policy and we look at the impact of
the (perfectly foreseen) policy on the laissez{faire (k; l) cycle. We assume the gov-
ernment (like ¯rms and trade unions) observes St and we look ¯rst at a balanced
budget ¯scal policy with gt = ¿t for all t.
Suppose the laissez{faire (k; l) cycle has been (m¤1; : : : ;m
¤
k+l) with outputs (Y
¤
1 ; : : : ;
Y ¤k+l) where
m¤i+1 = ®m
¤
i and Y
¤
i =
m¤i
1¡ c(m¤i =m¤i+1)) < AL; i = 1; : : : ; k; (14)
m¤i+1 ¸ ±m¤i and Y ¤i = m
¤
i
1¡ c(m¤i =m¤i+1)) = AL; i = k + 1; : : : ; k + l; (15)
(from now on identify i = k + l + 1 with i = 1). A natural Keynesian policy to
cure the unemployment in the ¯rst k periods of the cycle is to introduce positive
government spending during recessions:
(KBB) For all t, gt = ¿t ¸ 0 if St = R and gt = ¿t = 0 if St = B.
In particular, given the laissez{faire (k; l) cycle, suppose for i = 1; : : : ; k
gt = gi if St = : : : = St¡i+1 = R and St¡i = B:
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Thus gi is the expenditure in the ith period of a recession. With this policy, a new
(k; l) cycle (m1; : : : ;mk+l) with outputs (Y1; : : : ; Yk+l) has to satisfy
mi+1 = ®mi and Yi =
mi
1¡ c(mi=mi+1)) + gi · AL; i = 1; : : : ; k; (16)
mi+1 ¸ ±mi and Yi = mi1¡ c(mi=mi+1)) = AL; i = k + 1; : : : ; k + l: (17)
Suppose that gi 2 [0; AL¡ Y ¤i ], i = 1; : : : ; k. Then it is immediate from (14), (15),
(16) and (17), that there exists indeed a new cycle (m1; : : : ;mk+l), (Y1; : : : ; Yk+l)
with the following features:
(i) For all i = 1; : : : ; k + l, mi = m
¤
i . Since the nominal money stock evolves under
the balanced budget policy as under laissez{faire, prices also evolve as under
laissez{faire. Hence, nominal prices and so wages are una®ected by the ¯scal
policy. The economy responds to the policy in a \¯xprice" fashion.
(ii) For i = k + 1; : : : ; k + l, Yi = Y
¤
i = AL. Unsurprisingly the policy has no real
e®ects during booms.
(iii) For i = 1; : : : ; k, Yi = Y
¤
i + gi. During recessions the economy responds to the
government expenditure with gi producing a one{for{one increase in output.
We have the classic textbook unit balanced budget multiplier operating. And
if gi = AL¡ Y ¤i , i = 1; : : : ; k, output is stabilized at the full employment level
throughout the cycle.
Theorem 2: Suppose the laissez{faire economy has coordinated on a (k; l) cycle
up to period 0, with real balances (m¤1; : : : ;m
¤
k+l) and outputs (Y
¤
1 ; : : : ; Y
¤
k+l) given
by (14) and (15). Suppose the government announces in period 0 a Keynesian
balanced{budget ¯scal policy (KBB) in which expenditures are gi 2 [0; AL ¡ Y ¤i ]
in the ith period of a recession and zero throughout a boom. Then the policy
produces a perfect foresight (k; l) cycle in which recession output levels increase
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with a balanced{budget multiplier of one and in which nominal prices and wages
are as under laissez{faire. If gi = AL¡ Y ¤i , i = 1; : : : ; k, output is stabilized at the
full employment level throughout the cycle.
In the textbook ¯xprice story, the balanced{budget multiplier of one gives way
to a multiplier in excess of unity with unbalanced budgets where the government
expenditure is not matched by current taxation. A similar outcome can emerge here.
Start again from a laissez{faire (k; l) cycle given by (14) and (15) and consider the
following policy (suppose k ¸ 2):
(KUB) gt = g > 0 if St = R and St¡1 = B, and gt = 0 otherwise.
¿t = ¿ = ®
k¡1g > 0 if St = R and St¡k = B, and ¿t = 0 otherwise.
Here the government spends g in the ¯rst period of a recession and imposes the tax
¿ in the last recession period. The money supply thus expands at the beginning
of the recession and contracts at the end. The restriction ¿ = ®k¡1g means that
the contraction exactly matches the expansion since ® is the real gross interest rate
during recessions (see also the proof of Theorem 3). If g is small then the economy's
response is again \¯xprice", but now with multipliers (on g) in excess of unity for
all periods of the recession.15
Theorem 3: Suppose the same laissez{faire starting point as Theorem 2. Now
the government announces in period 0 a Keynesian unbalanced budget ¯scal policy
(KUB). If g is su±ciently small, then the policy produces a perfect foresight (k; l)
cycle in which the output in each period of a recession increases by a multiplier
(of g) in excess of unity, and in which nominal prices and wages evolve as under
laissez{faire.
15If the budget is re{balanced only in the ¯rst boom period instead of the last recession period,
multipliers are still positive, but possibly less than unity.
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Theorems 2 and 3 show how Keynesian ¯scal policies may produce ¯xprice responses
with textbook multipliers in our model. We should point out that the unit multi-
pliers of Theorem 2 result from the fact that labour supply is perfectly elastic at
the reservation wage and inelastic at all other wages, which leads to a horizontal AS
curve in the Keynesian regime. With a more general upward sloping labour supply
schedule, ¯scal policies may induce price changes. We would expect, however, that
multipliers are close to the multipliers of Theorems 2 and 3 if the labour supply
curve is close to ours.
Of course, policies outside the range of Theorems 2 and 3 may produce di®erent
prices from laissez{faire and so di®erent multipliers. In the following we brie°y
report our results for some policy variations like a non{cyclical policy, excessive
government spending, permanently unbalanced budgets or income taxation in the
case of a Cobb{Douglas intertemporal utility function. Detailed derivations are
contained in Appendix B.
When government spending is the same in all periods (booms as well as recessions -
e.g. the government cannot observe St), the balanced{budget multiplier is still pos-
itive but falls below unity. Government spending during booms produces in°ation
in all boom periods k + 1; : : : ; k + l which raises the reservation wage and thereby
the union wage in period k. This leads again to higher in°ation in period k and
by the same argument to higher in°ation and higher wages in all recession periods.
The higher wages lead to lower employment and output levels than those obtained
with a (KBB) policy in which government spending is raised only during recessions.
Similarly, excessive government spending or permanently unbalanced budgets lead
to in°ation in recession periods and thus to higher wage demands and higher un-
employment in all previous recession periods. On the other hand, it can be shown
that even a contractionary policy without government spending but with taxation
at the end of a recession raises recession output levels with the same tax multipliers
23
as a (KUB) policy with positive government spending. Thus, it is the de°ationary
e®ect of the contraction at the end of the recession which raises output and not the
government spending at the beginning.
Finally, if the government levies a proportional tax on (wage and pro¯t) income
instead of a lump{sum tax, the reservation wage and thereby the union wage are
directly adversely a®ected by taxation. A higher income tax rate has thus three
e®ects on the recession output levels: a positive aggregate demand e®ect since a
higher tax rate raises aggregate demand (similar to equation (1) in case of a lump{
sum tax), a positive in°ation e®ect if the increase of the tax rate is not matched by
an increase of government spending (as in case of a lump{sum tax, a budget surplus
decreases in°ation which leads to lower wages in the previous period), but now also
a negative labour supply (reservation wage) e®ect. Both in case of a (KBB) and
in case of a (KUB) policy the negative labour supply e®ect o®sets the two positive
e®ects, and so Theorems 2 and 3 do not extend to the case of an income tax. Instead
all multipliers become negative.16
5 Conclusions
This paper contains several features which are new relative to the existing literature.
First, the ¯rms' coordination problem in our model provides a novel explanation for
multiple equilibria under imperfect competition. Second, these multiple equilibria
give rise to many endogenous cycles which exhibit several stylized business cycle
features. And third, our policy analysis reproduces Keynesian textbook multipliers
in a dynamic general equilibrium model without nominal rigidities.
Our multiplicity results use the assumption that sectoral labour markets are sepa-
16See also Molana & Moutos (1991) who show that the positive multipliers of Dixon (1987) and
Mankiw (1988) become zero or negative if there is income taxation.
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rated in the sense that workers can only work for ¯rms in one sector, but nowhere
else, and that these workers are represented by one sectoral trade union. It is worth
pointing out, however, that the same multiplicity would emerge in an economy with
one homogenous labour market and with a single trade union, in which workers can
freely move between sectors but face a positive, arbitrarily small cost if they do
not work in their home sector.17 All wages in the intermediate range of Figure 1
produce again two equilibria: an unemployment equilibrium in which ¯rms in all
sectors coordinate on the Cournotian labour demand of Proposition 1(a); but there
is also a full employment equilibrium in which all ¯rms signal the excess labour
demands of Proposition 1(b) since a lower labour demand of any one ¯rm would
not alter employment, output and price levels of all sectors when it is costly for the
workers to move to another sector.
The ¯rms' coordination problem can lead to a Walrasian temporary equilibrium even
though there is imperfect competition on both the labour and the output markets.
When ¯rms believe in a boom state, they create excess vacancies and behave as
if they were price{takers whenever the wage is below the competitive wage. Trade
unions anticipate this behaviour and set the competitive wage since it is the maximal
wage consistent with full employment. In contrast, when ¯rms believe in a recession
state, the outcome is Keynesian unemployment, as would be expected in any model
with imperfect competition on the output and the labour market. Fiscal policy in
both regimes has opposite e®ects: in the Walrasian regime prices change and output
stays constant, and vice versa in the Keynesian regime.
17A similar argument would apply if there were several separated labour markets, each comprising
one trade union and many di®erent sectors.
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Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1:
(a) Notice ¯rst that the unique Cournot equilibrium (i.e. the Nash equilibrium of
the game in `jst without a labour supply constraint), is symmetric and is given by
`jst = `st=N which is less than L=N provided that wst > (½N ¡ 1)=(½N)wct . Now
consider the game in J jst. Clearly, any J
j
st · L ¡ (N ¡ 1)`st=N leads to `jst = J jst
and therefore gives no higher pro¯t than J jst = `st=N . If a ¯rm tries to create an
aggregate excess demand for labour with J jst > L¡ (N ¡ 1)`st=N , uniform rationing
implies `ist = `st=N , i 6= j, and `jst = L¡(N¡1)`st=N , irrespective of J jst. Therefore,
J jst = `st=N is a best response to J
i
st = `st=N , i 6= j. The equilibrium sector price is
obtained immediately from (2), yst = A`st and the de¯nition of w
c
t .
(b) Notice that any J jst ¸ 0 leads to full employment in sector s, since Pi6=j J ist ¸ L.
Thus, the sector output price remains at pst = Pt(Yt=AL)
1=½ = wct=A, and each
(constant returns) ¯rm would optimally produce as much as possible if wst · wct .
Uniform rationing implies that `jst = L=N for all J
j
st ¸ L=N and J ist ¸ L=N , i 6= j.
In particular, any J jst ¸ L=(N ¡ 1) is a best response to J ist ¸ L=(N ¡ 1), i 6= j. 2
Proof of Proposition 2:
(a) follows easily from the fact that the unconstrained maximum of w¡½st (wst ¡ wrt )
is wst = ½w
r
t=(½¡ 1).
(b) If the union sets the wage wst = w
c
t , its payo® is W1 = (w
c
t ¡ wrt )L. If wct >
½wrt =(½¡ 1), then the union's payo®
³½N ¡ 1
½N
wct
wst
´½
L(wst ¡ wrt )
is decreasing in wst for wst > w
c
t and less than W1 at wst = w
c
t ; so w
c
t is the union
optimum then. If wct < ½w
r
t=(½¡ 1), the best the union can get from wst > wct is at
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wst = ½w
r
t=(½¡ 1) giving the payo®
W2 =
³(½N ¡ 1)(½¡ 1)wct
½2Nwrt
´½
L 1½¡ 1wrt :
Therefore, W1 ¸ W2 if and only if
©(¹z) := ¹z ¡ 1¡
³½N ¡ 1
½N (1¡ 1=½)¹z
´½ 1
½¡ 1 ¸ 0 ; (18)
where ¹z := wct=w
r
t . Notice that this inequality is not ful¯lled at ¹z = 1, but that it
is strictly ful¯lled at ¹z = ½=(½ ¡ 1). Since © is strictly increasing on [1; ½=(½ ¡ 1)],
there exists a unique z 2 (1; ½=(½ ¡ 1)) which ful¯lls (18) with equality, and any
¹z 2 (z; ½=(½ ¡ 1)) satis¯es (18). Therefore, wct ¸ zwrt if and only if the union's
optimal wage is wct . 2
Proof of Theorem 1:
As has been noted above, a (k; l) cycle exists if and only if there is a ¯xed point of
the map Ã = ®k ¢ ¯l in the interval [m^l; ¹m]. Notice that
¯ 0(m) = 1
c¡1(1¡m=(AL)) +
m=(AL)
c¡1(1¡m=(AL))2c0(c¡1(1¡m=(AL)))
> 1
c¡1(1¡m=(AL)) :
Hence, at any ¯xed point mF of Ã we have
Ã0(mF ) = ®k ¢ ¯ 0(mF ) ¢ ¯0(¯(mF )) ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¯ 0(¯l¡1(mF ))
> ®k ¢ 1
c¡1(1¡mF=(AL)) ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢
1
c¡1(1¡ ¯l¡1(mF )=(AL))
= ®k ¢ ¯(m
F )
mF
¢ ¯
2(mF )
¯(mF )
¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¯
l(mF )
¯l¡1(mF )
=
®k ¢ ¯l(mF )
mF
= 1 :
Since Ã( ¹m) = ®k ¢ ¹m > ¹m, the condition Ã(m^l) · m^l is necessary and su±cient for
the existence of a ¯xed pointmk+1 of Ã in [m^l; ¹m], and whenever a ¯xed point exists,
it is unique. Since Ã describes also the local forward perfect foresight dynamics when
the (k; l) cycle is interior, Ã0(mk+1) > 1 implies stability of any interior (k; l) cycle in
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the local backward perfect foresight dynamics. If l = 1, m^ = m^l and the condition
Ã(m^) · m^ is equivalent to ®k± · 1. Hence, a (k; 1) cycle exists i® ®k± · 1. Suppose
®k± · 1 and consider any k0 · k and l ¸ 1. Since
®k
0
¯(m^) = ®k
0
±m^ · ®k±m^ · m^ · m^l
we have Ã(m^l) = ®
k0¯l(m^l) = ®
k0¯(m^) · m^l and thus the existence of a (k0; l) cycle.
Finally, we have to show the existence of a non{degenerate stationary sunspot
equilibrium with k unemployment states S1; : : : ; Sk and l full employment states
Sk+1; : : : ; Sk+l and positive transition probabilities ¼
j
i , i; j = 1; : : : ; k+ l. The utility
maximization problem of the consumer under uncertainty has similar solutions as
under certainty. The only di®erence is that the functions c and f are replaced by
c
³ P 1t+1
PtRt+1
; : : : ;
P k+lt+1
PtRt+1
;¦i
´
and f
³ P 1t+1
PtRt+1
; : : : ;
P k+lt+1
PtRt+1
;¦i
´
;
where Pt is the price level in period t, P
1
t+1; : : : ; P
k+l
t+1 are the expected price levels
for the next period, and ¦i = (¼
1
i ; : : : ; ¼
k+l
i ) is the vector of transition probabilities
assuming St = Si. These functions are continuously di®erentiable in all arguments
(since u is twice di®erentiable) and coincide with c(P jt+1=PtRt+1) and f(P
j
t+1=PtRt+1)
if ¼ji = 1. The equilibrium conditions (8) and (10) change accordingly. Since a (k; l)
cycle is a degenerate sunspot equilibrium with transition probabilities ¼1k+l = ¼
i+1
i =
1, i = 1; : : : ; k+ l¡1, and ¼ji = 0 else, the implicit function theorem yields a solution
(m1; : : : ;mk+l) of the equations in (8) and (10) when the transition matrix is close
to the degenerate transition matrix (the inequalities in (8) and (10) are then also
ful¯lled since they hold strictly at the interior (k; l) cycle) and when the Jacobian of
the equilibrium equations at the cycle is invertible. But this condition turns out to
be equivalent to the condition dmt+k+l=dmtjmt=m1 = Ã0(mk+1) 6= 1 which has been
shown above. 2
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Proof of Theorem 3:
The conditions of a (k; l) cycle (m1; : : : ;mk+l), (Y1; : : : ; Yk+l) under a (KUB) policy
are:
mi+1 = ®mi and Yi =
mi
1¡ c(mi=mi+1) < AL; i = 1; : : : ; k¡2; (19)
mk = ®mk¡1 ¡ ¿ and Yk¡1 = mk¡11¡ c(mk¡1=(mk + ¿)) < AL; (20)
mk+1 = ®mk and Yk =
mk
1¡ c(mk=mk+1) + ¿ < AL; (21)
mi+1 ¸ ±mi and Yi = mi1¡ c(mi=mi+1) = AL; i = k+1; : : : ; k+l¡1; (22)
m1 ¸ ±mk+l + g and Yk+l = mk+l1¡ c(mk+l=(m1 ¡ g)) = AL: (23)
From (19), (20) and (21) we obtain mk+1 = ®
km1 ¡ ®¿ and using (22) and (23) we
¯nd
m1 ¡ g = ¯l(mk+1) = ¯l(®km1 ¡ ®¿ ) = ¯l(®k(m1 ¡ g)) :
Thus, m1 = m
¤
1+ g, since m
¤
1 is the unique ¯xed point of ¯
l(®k:). From (19) follows
mi = m
¤
i+®
i¡1g for i = 1; : : : ; k¡1, (20) impliesmk = ®k¡1(m¤1+g)¡¿ = ®k¡1m¤1 =
m¤k, (21) implies mk+1 = ®m
¤
k = m
¤
k+1 and (22) yields mk+i = ¯
i¡1(m¤k+1) = m
¤
k+i
for all i = 2; : : : ; l. From this and (19), (20) and (21) we obtain the recession output
levels:
Yi = Y
¤
i +
®i¡1
1¡ c(1=®) ¢ g ; i = 1; : : : ; k ¡ 1 ;
Yk = Y
¤
k + ®
k¡1g :
If g is su±ciently small, we have Yi · AL for all i = 1; : : : ; k. Moreover, all
multipliers of g are greater than one. Furthermore, the inequalities in (22) are
ful¯lled since mi+1 = m
¤
i+1 ¸ ±m¤i = ±mi for i = k + 1; : : : ; k + l ¡ 1 and the
inequality in (23) is ful¯lled since m1 = m
¤
1 + g ¸ ±m¤l+k + g = ±ml+k + g. Hence,
(m1; : : : ;mk+l) is indeed a (k; l) cycle if g is su±ciently small.
Finally, we have to show that prices are the same as under laissez{faire. Consider
some period t in which St = B and St+1 = R, and so Mt =M
¤
t (since the budget is
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balanced during a boom, the money stock at the end of the boom coincides with the
laissez{faire money stock). Using mt+1 = m
¤
t+1 + g (since t+ 1 is the ¯rst recession
period), M¤t+1 = Rt+1M
¤
t andMt+1 = Rt+1Mt+Pt+1g, we obtain easily Pt+1 = P
¤
t+1.
For 2 · i · k ¡ 1 we know Mt+i = Rt+2 ¢ ¢ ¢Rt+iMt+1 and mt+i = ®i¡1mt+1 from
which we obtain
Rt+2 ¢ ¢ ¢Rt+iPt+1 = ®i¡1Pt+i ; (24)
for i = 2; : : : ; k¡1. FromMt+k = Rt+2 ¢ ¢ ¢Rt+kMt+1¡Pt+k¿ andmt+k = ®k¡1mt+1¡
¿ we also obtain (24) for i = k. Since (24) also holds for (P ¤t+1; P
¤
t+i) and since
Pt+1 = P
¤
t+1, we have Pt+i = P
¤
t+i for all i = 2; : : : ; k. Equation (24) also implies
that the budget is in fact re{balanced in period t + k, and since there is no ¯scal
policy between t+ k + 1 and t+ k + l we have Mt+i =M
¤
t+i and Pt+i = P
¤
t+i for all
i = k + 1; : : : ; k + l. 2
Appendix B: Policy variations
We assume throughout this appendix a Cobb{Douglas utility function, so that the
propensity to consume is a constant c 2 (0; 1) and the function f is f(µ) = µ1¡c.
Non{cyclical policy
Consider a balanced{budget policy in which government spending is the same in all
periods (booms as well as recessions { e.g. the government cannot observe St), so
gi = ¿i = g, i = 1; : : : ; k + l. With such a policy it turns out that a higher level of
government activity g raises output during recessions, but with a multiplier below
unity. In fact, if ®k± · 1, it can be shown that for any g 2 [0; AL), there exists a
(k; l) cycle in which recession output levels are
Yi = ®
¡(k+1¡i)(AL¡ g) + g < AL ; i = 1; : : : ; k :
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Thus the multiplier is 1 ¡ ®¡(k+1¡i) < 1 and there is partial crowding out during
recessions and full crowding out during booms.
Excessive spending
Starting from a (KBB) policy, suppose the government spends \excessively" during
a recession period (but unlike the ¯rst case does not expend during booms). Specif-
ically consider a laissez{faire (k; l) cycle where k > 1 and a (KBB) policy where
gk = AL¡ Y ¤k and gi = 0 otherwise. From Theorem 2, the only policy impact is to
raise Yk from Y
¤
k to AL. Now suppose that the expenditure in k becomes slightly
excessive: gk = AL¡Y ¤k + " with some small " > 0. The equilibrium conditions (8),
(9) and (10) produce a new (k; l) cycle as follows. From (9) for a period k
Yk =
mk
1¡ c +AL¡ Y ¤k + " = AL implies mk = m¤k ¡ "(1¡ c) :
Applying (8) for periods i = 1; : : : ; k ¡ 1 gives
mi = m
¤
i ¡ 1®k¡i "(1¡ c) ; Yi =
mi
1¡ c = Y ¤i ¡ "®k¡i ; i = 1; : : : ; k ¡ 1:
With mi = m
¤
i and Yi = Y
¤
i , i = k+1; : : : ; k+ l, we have a new (k; l) cycle satisfying
(8) for i = 1; : : : ; k ¡ 1, (9) for i = k and (10) for i = k + 1; : : : ; k + l if " is small
enough. On this cycle recession prices (and so wages) are everywhere higher, and
recession outputs are lower (the same in the last period k) than under the ¯rst
(KBB) policy.
Permanently unbalanced budgets
Consider a policy of permanently unbalanced budgets in which the government never
re{balances its budget by taxation. Suppose positive government spending during
recessions g1; : : : ; gk ¸ 0 and gi = 0 otherwise, and no taxation ¿i = 0 for all i.
Then, if g1; : : : ; gk are small enough, the equilibrium conditions (8) and (10) can be
solved for a (k; l) cycle in which for i = 1; : : : ; k ¡ 1:
mi = m
¤
i ¡ ®¡(k¡i)gk ¡ : : :¡ ®¡1gi+1 ;
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and mi = m
¤
i for i = k; : : : ; k + l. Recession outputs are Yk = Y
¤
k and for i =
1; : : : ; k ¡ 1,
Yi = Y
¤
i ¡ 11¡ c
³
®¡(k¡i)gk ¡ : : :¡ ®¡1gi+1
´
;
and so decreasing in gi+1; : : : ; gk. Similar to the excessive spending policy above,
this policy produces in°ation in periods i = 2; : : : ; k, and therefore raises wages and
lowers output in periods i = 1; : : : ; k ¡ 1.
On the other hand, a modi¯ed (KUB) policy in which g = 0 but ¿ > 0 leads to the
same equilibrium conditions (19){(23) as a (KUB) policy with positive government
spending. Thus, tax multipliers on recession output levels are the same as for a
(KUB) policy with positive government spending.18
Income taxation
Denote the income tax rate in period t again by ¿t 2 [0; 1). The net income of
young consumers is then Int = (1¡ ¿t)PtYt and the government's budget constraint
Mt = Mt¡1Rt + Ptgt ¡ ¿tPtYt. Using these two equations, the aggregate demand
equation (7) is now replaced by
Yt =
mt
(1¡ c)(1¡ ¿t) : (25)
The reservation wage is now wrt = bPtf(Pt+1=(PtRt+1))=(1¡¿t). These modi¯cations
imply that in the equilibrium conditions (3) and (4) the constant b has to be replaced
by b=(1¡¿t). Using the same de¯nitions of ® and ± and the fact that f is also Cobb{
Douglas, we ¯nd that there is an unemployment equilibrium in case of St = R if
mt+1 ¡ gt+1 + ¿t+1Yt+1 = ®(1¡ ¿t)1=(c¡1)mt and Yt < AL ; (26)
and that there is a full employment equilibrium in case of St = B if
mt+1 ¡ gt+1 + ¿t+1Yt+1 ¸ ±(1¡ ¿t)1=(c¡1)mt and Yt = AL ; (27)
18This result is only valid for a Cobb{Douglas utility function. In the general gross substitutes
case, tax multipliers become even larger without government spending.
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where Yt is given by (25).
Consider ¯rst a (KBB) policy: ¿t ¸ 0 if St = R, ¿t = 0 otherwise, gt = ¿tYt =
¿t=(1¡¿t)¢mt=(1¡c), and start again from a laissez{faire (k; l) cycle (m¤1; : : : ;m¤k+l),
(Y ¤1 ; : : : ; Y
¤
k+l). If ¿1; : : : ; ¿k are su±ciently small, the equilibrium conditions (26) and
(27) can be solved for a (k; l) cycle in which mi = m
¤
i , i = k + 1; : : : ; k + l, and
mi =
Qk
j=i(1¡ ¿j)1=(1¡c)m¤i , i = 1; : : : ; k. Recession outputs are
Yi = (1¡ ¿i)¡1
kY
j=i
(1¡ ¿j)1=(1¡c) ¢ Y ¤i ; i = 1; : : : ; k:
The ¯rst factor is the positive aggregate demand e®ect of the tax in period i, while
the second factor is the negative labour supply e®ect of the income tax. Not only
the higher reservation wage in period i lowers output in period i, but also the higher
reservation wages in periods i+ 1; : : : ; k since they raise in°ation in future periods
which leads also to higher wage demands in period i. The net e®ect of the income
tax rates on the recession output is unambiguously negative.
Consider next a (KUB) policy: ¿k = ¿ ¸ 0, ¿i = 0 otherwise and g1 = g = ®1¡k¿Yk =
®1¡k¿=(1¡ ¿ ) ¢mk=(1¡ c), gi = 0 else. Similar to the case of a lump{sum tax, the
conditions for a (k; l) cycle are now:
mi+1 = ®mi and Yi =
mi
1¡ c < AL; i = 1; : : : ; k¡2;
mk = ®mk¡1 ¡ ¿Yk and Yk¡1 = mk¡11¡ c < AL;
mk+1 = ®(1¡ ¿ )1=(c¡1)mk and Yk = mk(1¡ c)(1¡ ¿ ) < AL;
mi+1 ¸ ±mi and Yi = mi1¡ c = AL; i = k+1; : : : ; k+l¡1;
m1 ¸ ±mk+l + g and Yk+l = mk+l1¡ c = AL:
If ¿ is small enough, these conditions can be solved for a (k; l) cycle as follows: mi =
m¤i , i = k+1; : : : ; k+ l, and in period k, mk = (1¡¿)1=(1¡c)m¤k and output Yk = (1¡
¿ )1=(1¡c)¡1Y ¤k is falling in ¿ ; the labour supply e®ect dominates the aggregate demand
e®ect. In period k¡1 we ¯nd mk¡1 = (1¡ ¿)1=(1¡c)m¤k¡1+ ¿(1¡ ¿ )1=(1¡c)¡1Y ¤k¡1 and
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output is
Yk¡1 = (1¡ ¿)1=(1¡c)
³
1 + ¿
(1¡ ¿)(1¡ c)
´
Y ¤k¡1 : (28)
In periods i = 1; : : : ; k ¡ 2, we have mi = ®¡(k¡i¡1)mk¡1 and so outputs are
Yi = ®
¡(k¡i¡1)Yk¡1 = (1¡ ¿)1=(1¡c)
³
1 + ¿
(1¡ ¿)(1¡ c)
´
Y ¤i : (29)
In equations (28) and (29), the ¯rst factor is the negative labour supply e®ect,
while the second factor contains both the positive in°ation e®ect and the positive
aggregate demand e®ect. It can be checked easily that the total e®ect is negative,
i.e. increases in ¿ decrease output in periods i = 1; : : : ; k ¡ 1.
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